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Introduction 
On June 5th 2017 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt (the “Quartet”) cut 
their relations with Qatar. The Quartet decided to withdraw their ambassadors and impose a 
travel and trade ban. This has caught Qatar by surprise, which did not expect such drastic steps 
to be taken. Due to the Quartet actions the financial outflows and the costs have been massive 
for Qatar, but the system can absorb great shocks because of accumulated reserves and the 
income from the export of gas. The financial burden is nevertheless hitting the state hard, and 
it will be more and more difficult to sustain the current level of expenditure. So far Qatar has 
managed to adjust to the new reality mainly thanks to the financial reserves accumulated in the 
last two decades, the use of networks and an effective PR/lobbying campaign. 
 
 
The Context 
In the last two decades Qatar has been able to develop policies independently from the rest of 
the GCC. This is because Qatar has a small population, negligible minorities and a centralized 
state that allows to avoid any ethno-religious tensions affecting some of the neighboring 
countries.  More importantly, massive gas reserves give the country financial strength and the 
ability to project power. Qatar is the only gas player in the region since its neighbors export 
mainly oil. Doha’s independent foreign policy includes support of Islamists groups in the 
region as well as a pragmatic relationship with Iran with whom it shares the biggest gas field 
in the world. All this runs counter to Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s policy of zero tolerance 
towards political Islam since the “Arab Spring” started. Additionally, as Qatar is 
geographically located between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it needs to play a balancing act between 
them. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia wants to limit the Iranian influence in the region. As 
such, the Saudis need the GCC to be united to counter the rising influence of Iran, hence they 
want Qatar to be in line. 
So the question is, why has this happened? Qatar has not done anything out of the ordinary to 
suddenly provoke this situation but previous attempts to pressure Doha have failed.  Saudi and 
the UAE arrived at a saturation point where they could no longer tolerate Qatar’s “behavior” 
any longer.  They also felt support in the current US administration, thus the only solution left 
was to escalate matters.  
 
 
Economic and Financial Impact of the Sanctions 
There are three main channels through which the sanctions imposed by the Quartet affects 
Qatar: trade disruptions, lower confidence and tighter financial conditions.  
 
Trade Disruption 
In terms of trade, closing borders and connections with Saudi and the UAE had a negative 
impact on Qatar since roughly 13% of imports to Qatar was coming from Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE and circa 7% of Qatar’s exports was going to UAE. More importantly, Jebel Ali (UAE) 
is the trans-shipment hub of the region. Thus, with products being shipped there before 
distribution across the gulf, the ban forced Qatari distributors to find new shipping routes to 
import products. The Qatari government acted with immediacy in finding alternative food 
suppliers from Turkey, Iran and some European countries from the start of the crisis. Qatari 
distributors have also found new suppliers from other countries in Europe and Asia. The Qatari 
government partially covered the additional costs of importing items and in some cases 
contained food price hikes by demanding state-owned distributors not to increase prices, 
thereby avoiding high inflation in the system.  
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Lower confidence 
The prolonged diplomatic rift has caused a reduction in confidence and a higher risk perception 
among foreign investors. This could lead to a reduction of investment in the country which 
comes at a delicate time on the lead up to preparations for the 2022 World Cup. Furthermore, 
the Qatari government has been obliged to cut many infrastructure and development projects. 
This will also affect the long-term diversification plans to position the country as a hub for air 
traffic, tourism, medical services, education, and sports.  
Apart from the current sanctions that limits business between Qatar and the Quartet, the crisis 
has also created an informal boycott where people and companies of one side, i.e. Qatar or the 
Quartet, tend to boycott products and companies that belong to or have relationships with the 
other side, hence limiting business opportunities both for local and foreign companies. The 
result is a decrease of trade and investment in the region. 
 
Tighter financial conditions 
The ban caused an initial massive outflow of liquidity, but the impact on banks’ balance sheets 
was mitigated by liquidity injections from the Qatar Central Bank and increased public sector 
deposits. The sovereign fund played a key role in stabilizing the liquidity and covering 
increased state expenses. 
 
 
Logistics 
Logistics remains the main problem. Importing goods via sea or land from Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE is obviously much cheaper than importing by air or longer routes. Jebel Ali in the 
UAE is the transhipment hub of the region and many products are shipped there before 
distribution across the Gulf. The Quartet ban has thus forced Qatari distributors to find new 
shipping routes to import products. An alternative route is via Oman or via Kuwait, but this 
require longer delivery times and higher costs. For example, goods can arrive to Qatar via sea 
to Sohar in Oman and then via air to Doha. While the routes via Oman and Kuwait take a few 
days longer, the unexpected volume of goods to be handled in Kuwait and Oman has caused 
serious delays, sometimes up to weeks.  Qatari companies have been hit twice: (1) the cost of 
shipping via the new routes is higher; and (2) the delay means a higher working capital that 
causes an additional financing cost at a time of scarce liquidity in the domestic market. 
Consequently, Qatar was forced to speed up operations at the new Doha port. The port 
authorities have been signing agreements with ports in different parts of the world to establish 
direct shipping connections to Europe and Asia. An agreement has also been signed between 
Qatar, Iran and Turkey whereby goods can move via sea between Qatar and Iran and via land 
between Iran and Turkey. Another agreement was signed with Oman to have a direct air link 
between Sohar port in Oman and Doha. Qatar is also financing the development of Sohar port 
in Oman. Sohar is strategically located outside the Strait of Hormuz. Hence, it has a better 
location than Jebel Ali. While Jebel Ali currently has much better infrastructure and 
connectivity, Sohar’s expansion could over time potentially take over part of the business from 
Jebel Ali due to its better geographic location. 
 
 
Energy 
There are no sanctions on the Qatari energy sector. The UAE imports 30% of its gas needs 
from Qatar via a sub-sea pipeline known as the Dolphin project. Qatar has not retaliated by 
cutting supply while UAE has kept buying from Qatar for its gas supplies. Qatar has a strategic 
interest in maintaining a constant flow of gas to its clients located mainly in Asia and maintains 
a strong position in the market. These clients – Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan - 
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represent the biggest buyers of LNG in the world and they are critical to providing income to 
Qatar. However, none of these buyers can provide the security that Qatar craves. In any case, 
neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE is keen to bring Qatar’s gas exports to a complete halt. 
Exxon, Chevron, Total and Shell are all involved in the energy industry in Qatar, which 
represents an important part of their global gas liquefaction capacity. KSA/UAE are well aware 
of that and they know that imposing sanctions on Qatar LNG exports would trigger retaliation 
by the US, Europe and Asia. Thus, the energy exports of Qatar, which are the main source of 
Qatari income, have not been and will not be affected. They will be affected by changes in the 
gas market and not by the sanctions.  
Many countries are trying to lower their carbon profile and gas is less polluting than oil or coal. 
While this increases the demand for gas, exploitation of existing gas fields and new gas fields 
are likely to keep gas prices low in the long term. Gas is also competing with renewable 
energies which are the fastest growing sources of energy.  
Qatar had previously imposed a moratorium on the development of new gas fields to keep 
prices high. However, in April 2017, Qatar removed its moratorium and announced its intent 
to increase gas production capacity, thus sending a strong message to the market. This is a two-
fold strategy based on Qatar’s huge and low-cost resources and the knowledge that for many 
other players the costs are much higher. Qatar’s current and future investments, particularly in 
its north field, will ensure Qatar’s readiness with new LNG production quickly coming on-
stream when the market improves. Higher Qatari supply and the consequent price pressure will 
serve to dissuade rivals from developing higher cost gas fields. However, this also creates 
something of a dilemma for Qatar.  Higher supply and lower price expectations may lead to 
shorter contracts with much higher flexibility in price. A situation that favours the buyers. 
Shorter contracts and lower prices will probably be the norm for the coming years. This will 
have implications for Qatar’s long-term revenue stream. 
 
 
Regional Realities 
The gas reserves that Qatar relies upon are shared with Iran, who can also pressure Qatar. 
Currently Iran has limited access to technology and financing and therefore cannot exploit its 
share of reserves completely. However, it is in Qatar’s strategic interest to minimally maintain 
a working relationship with Iran to continue exploiting the shared gas field. To create the 
political space it needs to survive, Doha needs to maintain good or at least stable relations with 
Iran; Doha’s ability to accommodate KSA/UAE demands in this respect is limited. For the 
Saudis and Emiratis, it is clear that Qatar’s foreign policy will not change unless its leadership 
changes. The list of thirteen demands had one purpose and that was to signal to the Qataris that 
no compromise would be accepted. Doha can expect little, if any, support from the other Gulf 
states. Bahrain is in the Quartet and Qatar cannot expect limited support from Kuwait despite 
always having sought to play the role of a neutral mediator. Iran is of concern to Kuwait as it 
fears that Tehran could easily exploit its 20% Shia minority. The one Gulf country that has 
been helpful to Qatar is Oman. To date, Muscat has helped Qatar bypass the Quartet’s 
sanctions, benefitting in the process from the additional business coming from Doha since 
much of Qatar’s trade and people movement is now re-routed via Oman. Oman has always 
sought to maintain good relationships with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. But Oman is one of the 
least wealthy Gulf states and the succession to the ill Sultan Qaboos is creating uncertainty. 
Meanwhile in the region Turkey supports Qatar because it allows Ankara to build a presence 
(including a military presence) in Qatar and offers a market for Turkish companies. Iran is 
happy to see the GCC divided and to boost its trade with Qatar.  
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The US Role 
Qatar believes that US support is the key to its survival but there have been conflicting signals 
from the Trump Administration. The Trump administration, or at least the President personally, 
does not consider the Qatar crisis as a priority that needs to be resolved quickly. 
US interests in the Gulf are: (a) preserving its military assets in the region, (b) maintaining the 
flow of energy and (c) securing an alliance against Iran. Qatar, KSA and UAE all compete to 
attract US military assets in their countries. In addition, KSA and UAE have neither the 
inclination nor ability to stop Qatari energy exports, so this is not a major concern for US. Only 
Iran can potentially stop the flow of energy at the Strait of Hormuz.  
KSA/UAE (and Israel) are part of the US alliance against Iran while, as previously argued, 
Qatar cannot afford to alienate Iran. This limits Doha’s ability to influence the Trump 
administration, although Qatar is not entirely without assets in Washington DC. The US 
military bases in Qatar – which are vital for US military operations in the Middle East – are of 
great concern to the Pentagon. It will not be easy (and from the Pentagon’s perspective, 
desirable) to quickly move the bases elsewhere. As long as the military bases remain, Doha 
can be assured of minimal support from the US against more extreme actions by the KSA/UAE.   
Furthermore, Qatar has ramped up its efforts to lobby members of the US Congress aimed at 
ensuring continuing US support and it is running an extensive PR campaign in the US and 
globally. In the meantime, the US has used the crisis to extract concessions from the GCC 
countries, an example being the recent deal to increase the transparency of Qatar Airway’s and 
Emirates finances, a win for the US aviation sector. The US has also taken the opportunity to 
increase arms sales to Qatar, UAE and KSA.  
It is presently unclear how internal Washington dynamics will eventually work out. Given US 
unpredictability, the KSA/UAE may not be able to rely on its support forever. It may well suit 
President Trump to keep both the KSA/UAE and Qatar guessing as it keeps both sides 
dependent on the US and vying for Washington’s favour.  
 
 
Qatar International Efforts  
Qatar’s strategy has been twofold: reaching out to the big powers to gain support for its cause 
while strengthening its relationship with Turkey and Iran to gain additional levers at the 
economic, political and military level.  Germany aside and to a certain extent Italy, none of the 
other European countries have been willing to press for a resolution to the dispute. Instead, 
many have capitalised on the situation to promote their business interests. Since the crisis 
began, arms deals have been announced with the US, the UK, France and Italy. Russia and 
China have also exploited the situation by selling arms to Qatar. For Qatar, domestically the 
intent is to demonstrate that the leadership takes its citizens’ security seriously, to boost the 
reputation of the Emir and to bolster nationalist sentiment. Regionally, Qatar has sought to 
remind the Quartet that their actions have thus far not impacted Qatar’s ties with the big powers 
and more importantly, Qatar can and will continue to pay for its security.  
Qatar has also reached out to China. For its part, the Chinese have not just strengthened their 
energy, business and security ties with Qatar, but much like the US, retains its security and 
other links with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar remains a lucrative market for China’s 
military hardware exports, something that China is keen to sell in a bid to balance its trade with 
Qatar. For China, as it shifts from coal to gas, it must secure a constant supply of gas while 
building higher strategic resource reserves. Thus, China will not only help Qatar in securing 
revenue, but could also provide access to financing. However, there are limits to what Beijing 
can do for Qatar. China is interested in securing its energy supplies from the Gulf and pushing 
for a trade increase with the Gulf. Ideally, it wants to achieve that without getting too involved 
in the dispute. Thus, it’s unlikely that Beijing will make any move that upsets KSA/UAE.  
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Conclusion 
So far Qatar has been successful not only in managing the financial, economic and logistical 
problems that the sanctions have created, but also in its public relations campaign. Qatar has 
definitely improved its position and generated international sympathy, also exposing some 
Saudi and UAE actions through leaks in the news. However, these successes can fade if Doha 
does not secure strong security guarantees, which at the moment can only be provided by the 
US. Neither the KSA nor the UAE are under pressure to end the sanctions. Qatar’s strategy of 
supporting Islamists, Iran and Turkey, while maintaining close relationships with Europe and 
the US, has been in place since the rule of its previous Emir. Qatar seems determined to 
maintain this strategy which its present leadership sees as a matter of survival.  
Qatar can hold out against the sanctions for years to come. The fact that it has not yet been 
forced to accede to demands has convinced some Qatari officials that survival is possible, even 
outside the (largely dead) GCC. The present Emir of Qatar is unlikely to change policy under 
pressure as doing so will make him appear weak and lead to challenges from other sections of 
the extended Royal family. The Qatari hope is that some support from the US and Europe, 
coupled with regional support from Turkey and Iran, can ensure long-term survival.  
As things now stand, it would appear that the impasse will continue unless one side or another 
gives in, or internal changes occur in Qatar. However, Qatar’s diminishing reserves, the high 
budget required to maintain self-sufficiency and a weak gas price, will limit and gradually 
degrade Qatar’s ability to hold out.  
Ironically the GCC was created after the Iranian Revolution to counter new security threats that 
the change of leadership of Iran created, whilst the current rise of Iran is contributing to call 
into question the integrity of the GCC. Even if ties are restored among Gulf countries, the 
escalation of events in 2017 has created wounds that are difficult to heal in the short-medium 
term. The GCC could become a less effective and more fragmented organization with bilateral 
relations, like Saudi-UAE and Qatar-Oman, becoming predominant versus the traditional 
consensus-building. 
 
 
 
 
 
.    .    .    . 
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